Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 01583 01 OF 02 212003Z

73
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W
---------- 044942
R 211730Z MAR 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 767
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1583

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR: ADHOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC, MARCH 21.

REF: A. MBFR VIENNA 121
B. USNATO 1555 DTG 201735Z MAR 75

SUMMARY: AHG ON MARCH 21 BRIFED THE NAC ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATION SINCE THE LAST REGULAR AHG BRIEFING ON FEBRUARY 38. AMBASSADOR DE VOS (NETHERLANDS) WAS PRINCIPAL AHG SPOKESMAN, ASSISTED BY AMBASSADOR RESOR, (U.S.), AND MINISTER SPYRIDAKIS (GREECE). DE VOS' REPORT LARGELY FOLLOWED THE TEXT IN REF A. QUESTIONS AND REMARKS BY PERMREPS LARGELY CENTERED ON OPTION III, WITH DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM), NARTOGH(NETHERLANDS), PANSA (ACTING SYG), AND ADMIRAL HILL-NORTON (CHAIRMAN OF MILITARY COMMITTEE) SUPPORTING EARLY ALLIED STUDY SO AHG WOULD HAVE GUIDANCE WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT. END SUMMARY.
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01583 01 OF 02 212003Z

1. AMBASSADOR DE VOS BEGAN THE DISCUSSION WITH T AREPORT ON THE NEGOTIATION WHICH LARGELY FOLLOWED THE TEXT IN REF A.

2. ACTING SYG (PANSA) NOTED THE LACK OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE OTHER

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

SIDE AND ASKED WHY, AND WHAT SHOULD BE THE ALLIES' RESPONSE.

3. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) SAID THE APPARENT CLAM IN VIENNA WAS A DANGEROUS ONE. HE NOTED THAT THE EAST HOPES TO HAVE PHASE III OF CSCE COMPLETED IN JULY. AFTER CONCLUSION OF CSCE, THE ALLIES CAN EXPECT SPEECHES BY BREZHNEV AND PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR ADVANCEMENT OF MILITARY SECURITY IN EUROPE. HE CONSIDERED IT URGENT THAT THE ALLIES PREPARE THEIR POSITION IN MBFR IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO SUCH PRESSURE AFTER CONCLUSION OF CSCE. HE SAW TWO AREAS IN MBFR FOR ALLIANCE WORK: OPTION III, AND THE COMMON CEILING. HE NOTED THAT BELGIUM HAD INTRODUCED A TEXT AT THE SPC MEETING THE PREVIOUS DAY ON THE COMMON CEILING, IN THE CONTEXT OF PRESENT SPC WORK ON THAT SUBJECT (REF B). PANSA AGREED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD DISCUSS THESE MATTERS INTERNALLY.

4. DE VOS SAID THE AHG HAS NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE CONNECTION OF MBFR WITH OTHER NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS CSCE. THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT AFTER CSCE THERE WOULD BE A GREATER SENSE OF EASTERN URGENCY AND READINESS TO NEGOTIATE ON MBFR. HE NOTED THAT THE EAST DID SEEM TO BE EXPECTING NEW ALLIED INITIATIVES, AND OPTION III WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION ON THEIR PART.

5. AMBASSADOR RESOR, IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION ON WHY THE EAST WAS MARKING TIME, NOTED DE VOS' INTRODUCTORY REMARKS THAT THE EAST IS CONFIDENT THAT ITS PRESENT POSTURE IS CREDIBLE WITH PUBLIC OPINION. REGARDING THE QUESTION ON WHAT THE ALLIES SHULD DO, HE NOTED THE AHG APPRAISAL THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SUBSTANTIAL MOVE FORWARD IN THE NEGOTIATION WITH THE POSI-TIONS AS THEY PRESENTLY ARE. HE SAID THE ALLIES SEEMED IN BENEFIT FROM A LACK OF PUBLIC FOCUS ON MBFR IN THE PRESS. HE SUPPOSED THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD. HOWEVER, RESOR NOTED THAT DE STAERCKE DID POINT TO A PROBLEM ON THE HORIZON, WHEN AFTER A CSCE SUMMIT, PUBLIC ATTENTION MAY FOCUS ON MBFR. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE TALKED FOR SOME TIME ABOUT COMPLIMENTING POLITICAL DETENTE WITH MILITARY DETENTE. KHLESTOV YESTERDAY AT THE PLENARY SESSION

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01583 01 OF 02 212003Z

HAD REFERRED TO DEVELOPING DETENTE. HE AGREED WITH DE STAERCKE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY FOLLOW THAT LINE WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED ITSELF, AND A SUMMIT WOULD BE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY. HOWEVER, THE AHG AS A GROUP HAS NOT LOOKED THAT FAR AHEAD. HE SAID HE PERSONALLY AGREED WITH THE NEED TO LOOK AHEAD.

6. PANSA SAID THAT IF THE ALLIES WANT MOVEMENT IN MBFR, THEY NEED TO BEGIN STUDYING ELEMENTS OF OPTION III.

7. MENZIES (CANADA) ASKED THE AHG REPS IF THEY SENSED IN THEIR INFORMAL CONTACTS WHAT MIGHT BE THE REACTION OF THE PACT TO AN ALLIED INITIATIVE ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND MORE PARTICULARLY WHETHER, HAVING PLAYED THE ALLIED ACE, THERE WOULD

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

BE ANY MORE DISPOSITION ON THE OTHER SIDE TO WORK TOWARD A
COMMON CEILING ON MANPOWER.

8. DE VOS REPLIED THAT THE AHG HAD NOT GONE INTO THAT SORT OF
DETAIL IN VIENNA IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF NAC CONSIDERATION OPTION
III. HE SAID IT WAS CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE OTHER SIDE IS WAITING FOR
THE ALLIES TO BRING IN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. THE ALLIES CAN ASSUME THAT
NUCLEAR ELEMENTS ARE IMPORTANT TO THE OTHER SIDE, WHOSE ATTACK
ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IS BASED ON THE CLAIM THAT THE
ALLIES ARE SINGLING OUT ONE ASPECT OF THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP.
RESOR SAID THAT THE AHG HAD NO CONCRETE INDICATION OF THE LIKELY
EASTERN REACTION TO OPTION III SINCE THE AHG HAD CAREFULLY MAIN-
TAINED THAT THE ALLIES WERE NOT PROPOSING INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR
ELEMENTS. HOWEVER, THE EAST CONTINUES TO CLAIM THAT THE ALLLIES
ARE IGNORING NUCLEAR AND AIR ELEMENTS. THE EAST HAS MADE CLEAR
TWO CRITERIA FOR A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION: REDUCTIONS OF EQUAL
VALUE; AND AN OVERALL CORRELATION OF FORCES IN THE AREA NOT
CHANGED TO THEIR DETRIMENT. SOMETHING LIKE OPTION III MIGHT PROVIDE
ARGUMENTS FOR SOMEONE ON THE OTHER SIDE
INTERESTED IN AN AGREEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ALLIES WERE
MEETING EASTERN REQUIREMENTS.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01583 02 OF 02 212044Z

73
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W
---------- 045828
R 211730Z MAR 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 768
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 1583

9. ADMIRAL HILL-NORTON (CHAIRMAN OF MILITARY COMMITTEE) SAID
NAC NEEDS A GOOD DEAL MORE INFORMATION ON THE DAMAGE EFFECTS OF
OPTION III, AS WELL AS MILITARY AND POLITICAL ADVICE
ON WHETHER ALLIES WOULD BETTER ADVOCATE IT FOR PHASE I OR

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

PHASE II. HE SAID HE HAD GATHERED SOME INFORMATION INTERNALLY,
I.E. WITHOUT CONSULTING SACEUR. HE THOUGHT THAT IF THE ALLIES
GAVE AWAY OPTION III IN PHASE I, THIS WOULD BE UNNECESSARY, AND
WOULD BE GIVING AWAY TOO MUCH, BUT HE NOTED THAT HE MADE THIS
REMARK WITHOUT COMPLETE INFORMATION.

10. ERALP (TURKEY) SAID THAT THE ALLIES ARE THINKING
IN TERMS OF OPTION III, AND THE OTHER SIDE IS EXPECTING TO BE
INTRODUCED. SINCE THAT IS THE CASE, THE OTHER SIDE IS MARKING
TIME. THE ALLIES NEED TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN CHOOSING
WHAT TO GIVE FOR WHAT OBJECTIVE. IF THE ALLIES PUT IN ADDITIONAL
EQUIPMENT TO ATTAIN THE COMMON CEILING, THAT MIGHT CREATE ADDITIONAL
IMBALANCES. HE OBSERVED THAT THERE WAS NOT ONLY A STALEMEATE IN
VIENNA, BUT THERE WAS ALSO A STALEMATE AT NATO ON THE FLANK
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01583 02 OF 02 212044Z

SECURITY ISSUE. HE SAID THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO GIVE THAT
ISSUE A PUSH.

11. SVART (DENMARK) SAID RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE OVER THE CENTURIES
LEADS THEM TO WANT TO OVER-INSURE REGARDING THEIR MILITARY
SECURITY. THE MILITATES AGAINST THE COMMON CEILING. THE
INDUCEMENT FOR THE COMMON CEILING WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY GREAT,
AND THE ALLIES SHOULD FACE THIS.

12. HARROGH (NETHERLANDS) SAID HE SHARED DE STAERCKE'S VIEWS.
THE ALLIES NEED TO LOOK AT OPTION III. HE NOTED THAT IN TALKING
ABOUT OPTION III, THE ALLIES ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT THE ORIGINAL
U.S. SUBMISSION ON OPTION III IN APRIL, 1973, BUT ARE NOT TALKING
ABOUT ADDING SOMETING TO THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION. HE SAID
HE SHARED DE STAERCKE'S APPEAL TO THE U.S. TO START ALLIANCE STUDY
OF OPTION III EARLY.
13. LOGAN (UK) INQUIRED WHETHER AHG HAD THE IMPRESSIONOPTION
III WAS A TRUMP CARD, OR WHETHER AFTER INTRODUCTION THE
OTHER SIDE WOULD STILL MAINTAIN OTHER ISSUES SUCH
AS NATINAL SUB-CEILINGS OR PHASING. RESOR REFERRED TO DE VOS'
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS DESCRIBING TWO MAIN STUMBLING BLOCKS SEEN
BY THE EAST: THAT THE WEST SEEKS UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE,
I.E. ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS; AND THET THE ALLIES
OTHER THAN THE U.S. REFUST TO ACCEPT SPECIFIC REDUCTION
COMMITMENTS FROM THE OUTSET. THE EAST WILL NOT GIVE UP THESE
CRITICISMS EASILY.

14. DE STAERCKE STRESSED THAT WHAT HE WAS ADVOCATING WAS AN
INTERNAL ALLIED STUDY, SO THAT THE ALLIES WOULD NOT LATER
BE CAUGHT BY SURPRISE BY THE NEED FOR GUIDANCE ON OPTION III.
HE ALSO NOTED, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NUNN REPORT, THAT
WITH MODERNIZATION THE ALLIES COULD AT NOO SACRIFICE INSERT
CERTAIN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS INTO MBFR. PANSA SAID HE
THOUGH TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, AND THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO
HAVE SOMETHING ONOPTION III PRIOR TO THE MINISTERIAL.

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

15. DE VOS NOTED THAT AHG DOES NOT HAVE SPECIFIC INFORMATION
ON OPTION III, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT BRINGING
IT IN WAS ESSENTIAL TO GET THE OTHER SIDE ENGAGED IN SERIOUS
NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01583 02 OF 02 212044Z

16. HILL-NORTON STRESSED THE DIFFICULTY FACED BY THE MILITARY
AUTHORITIES IN PRESENTING A VIEW ON AN UNFINISHED PROJECT.
PANSA SAID THAT THE NAC UNDERSTOOD THIS, AND THAT IT WAS
DIFFICULT FOR HILL-NORTON TO WORK IN A VACUUM. HILL-NORTON
SAID HE TOOK THAT AS AN INVITATION FOR MILITARY
AUTHORITIES TO PRESENT THEIR IDEAS, AND PANSA TOLD HILL-NORTON
HE HAD RIGHTOF INITIATIVE..

17. SELMER (NORWAY) ASKED IF AHG SAW A PRESSING NEED TO BE
VERY SPECIFIC WITH THE EAST ON FLANK SECURITY AT APRIL 10
PLENARY, OR IF AHG COULD SIMPLY REVERT IN GENERAL TERMS TO
PREVIOUS ALLIED STATEMENTS ON NEED TO SAFEGUARD FLANK SECURITY.
DE VOS SAID IT WAS USEFUL TO REMIND THE OTHER SIDE OF THIS
MATTER FROM TIME TO TIME, SO THE EAST WILL NOT THINK THAT THE
ALLIES HAVE LOST INTEREST. IT WOULD NOT BE ESSENTIAL TO HAVE GUIDANCE
BY APRIL 10. THE SUMMARY STATEMENT AT THE END OF THE PRESENT
NEGOTIATING ROUND WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REMIND THE OTHER
SIDE ABOUT FLANK SECURITY. SPYRIDAKIS SAID THERE WAS A NEED
FOR NAC GUIDANCE ON FLANK SECURITY FOR USE IN VIENNA WHEN THE
TIME IS RIGHT. HE AGREED THAT APRIL 10 DATE PROBABLY NOT
ESSENTIAL FOR GUIDANCE, AND IF NEW GUIDANCE WERE NOT AVAILABLE,
THE AHG WAS BOUND TO REPEAT ITSELF. ERALP ASKED IF IT WERE
NOT COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE ONLY TO MENTION FLANK SECURITY TO THE
OTHER SIDE AND POSSIBLY GIVE THEM THE IDEA THAT WE HAVE DISAGREE-
MENT AMONG OURSELVES ABOUT IT.CATALANO (ITALY) SAID HE
SUPPORTED ERALP'S REMARKS.

18. PANSA AGAIN SAID THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT FOR ALLIED STUDY
OF OPTION III. HE SAID SPC WOULD OF COURSE CONTINUE ITS WORK
ON FLANK SECURITY. HE NOTED, DATE OF NEXT AHG REPORT TO THE NAC
AS APRIL 18, AND PERMREPS RAISED NO OBJECTION.
BRUCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 MAR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO01583
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750398/abbrzixi.tel
Line Count: 260
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. MBFR VIENNA 121 B. USNATO 1555 DTG 201735Z MAR 75
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02 APR 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <07 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: ADHOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC, MARCH 21.
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO BONN
LONDON
MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006